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Abstract 
Relationships between political parties and interest groups form structures that enable and 
constrain political action. Yet there is a lack of consensus on what “party-group relationships” 
means. We propose a conceptualization focusing on ties as means for structured interaction, 
which is different from sharing or transfer of resources and ideological kinship. Our conceptual 
discussion suggests that organizational ties form a single yet hierarchical scale of strength: 
groups that have many formal ties with particular parties would also have weaker ties with these 
parties, but not vice versa. To validate our conceptual map, we furthermore check whether the 
distinction between organizational ties, resource sharing/provision and ideological kinship 
holds empirically. We explore our expectations by means of novel interest group survey data 
from seven mature democracies. The results of our scaling analysis provide support for our 
predictions and have multiple implications for future research on the causes and effects of party-
group relationships. 
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Introduction  
Relationships between political parties and interest groups have deep historical roots. One 
important characteristic of the concept “mass party” is that they have strong organizational ties 
with organized interests. Left-of-centre mass parties have strong ties to trade unions and left-
of-centre parties. Right-of-centre mass parties have strong ties to business associations and 
religious groups to religious parties. As a matter of fact, the ‘mass party model’ denotes a type 
of party that is organizationally amalgamated with, or even emerged out of a particular 
organized interest (Duverger, 1954/1972: 5–7; von Beyme, 1985: 192; Warner, 2000). 
 Later, these traditional connections declined (Allern and Bale, 2012; Kirchheimer, 
1966). Ad hoc contacts, allowing groups to retain flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre, 
became more useful with a growing number of parties and interest groups. Nevertheless, recent 
research shows that both old and new parties interact on regular basis with numerous interest 
groups in contemporary politics (e.g. Allern, 2010; Berkhout et al., 2019; Eichenberg and Mach, 
2017; Koger et al., 2009; Otjes and Rasmussen, 2017). Organizational connections still provide 
platforms for political influence and decision-making. Thus, party-group relationships form 
structures that may shape, enable, and constrain political action. Comprehending the properties 
and consequences of these relationships is therefore crucial for understanding the political 
world. Yet, we know relatively little about the nature, causes and consequences of these 
relationships across different political systems and policy sectors (Allern and Bale, 2012; 
Beyers et al., 2008; Fraussen and Halpin, 2016; Thomas, 2001; Witko, 2009).  
One reason for this is the lack of consensus on what core concepts denote. While 
individual parties and interest groups are often described as being ‘aligned’, ‘interlinked’, ‘tied’ 
and ‘connected’ as organizations, it is unclear and contested what this means both in theory and 
in practice. This article seeks to clarify this conceptual ambiguity. Therefore, we will address 
the question of what attributes are constitutive of party-interest group relationships both 
theoretically and empirically. We make the case for defining ‘the relationship’ as what connects 
participants and reserve the term ‘tie’ to the various attributes that create some sort of 
connection between the two sides.  
Our attention focuses on ties as structured interaction, which is different from sharing 
or transfer of resources and ideological affinity. In addition we make a conceptual distinction 
between organizational ties and the issue-based contacts which are often central to studies of 
interest groups. We also develop measures linking the relevant conceptual attributes with 
empirical observations to map the strength of organizational ties across countries. In this way, 
we are able to examine the questions of whether weaker (less formal) ties are a compensation 
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for a lack of stronger (formal) ties – or whether they rather supplement each other? This issue 
may have been a moot point historically, with a lack of large N-data preventing the investigation 
of such conceptual questions empirically. Finally, we also examine how our conceptualization 
of the relationship between parties and interest groups as structured interaction is related to the 
other conceptualizations of this relationship empirically (i.e. to ties based on resources or 
ideology).  
 Thus, the article addresses three specific research questions empirically: 1) To what 
extent is interaction between interest organizations and political parties based on organizational 
ties? 2) Is such structured interaction a one-dimensional phenomenon? That is, are different 
categories of organizational ties related, or do we need more than one dimension to analyze 
relationships? And more broadly: 3) Do the conceptual distinctions between different ties – 
interaction, resources and ideology – hold empirically? We use a broad concept of interest 
group (as associations), including non-party and non-governmental membership-based 
organizations and professional advocacy groups.1 The conceptual discussion is followed by an 
empirical investigation of the dimensionality of ties through a novel, built-for-purpose dataset 
based on an interest group survey conducted simultaneously in seven mature democracies.  
The empirical analysis largely confirms our conceptual map. It suggests that structured 
interaction is a one-dimensional phenomenon, but that a hierarchy of ties exists, and that 
organizational ties are empirically distinct from ties in terms of resource provision or 
ideological proximity. The results have multiple implications for future research. Firstly, the 
hierarchical one-dimensionality suggests that different ties are caused by the same factors but 
that their relative importance might vary at different levels of institutionalization. Future 
explanatory analyses of variation in party-group ties should therefore carefully consider this 
issue. Secondly, the results show that different conceptualizations of the relationship between 
parties and interest groups are empirically distinct. Therefore and thirdly, the various resources 
parties and interest groups might offer each other can be seen as possible explanatory factors 
or effects of structured organizational ties between an interest group and a political party. 
Fourthly, our findings also speak to the literature on political networks by confirming that many 
parties and interest groups are interdependent by means of institutionalized interaction. Thus, 
one should consider such ties as possible constraints when studying individual party-group 
choices of different kinds. Overall, our findings suggest that it is still crucial to understand 
                                                 
1 Thus excluding companies and public institutions; for details see Allern et al. 2000. 
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party-group relationships if we want to understand the functioning of both party and interest 
group politics today. 
The challenge of conceptualization 
What constitutes ‘relationships between interest groups and parties’ is unclear and contested 
(Allern and Bale, 2012). Some scholars use the term relationships in a wide, system-oriented 
sense. Heaney (2010) approaches, for example, party-group relationships as how parties and 
interest groups act or compete as ‘brokers’ vis-à-vis each other. Others identify party strategies 
vis-à-vis interest groups in terms of affiliation, alliances and co-optation (Schwartz, 2005). 
Likewise, interest group scholars have mainly focused on groups’ lobbying strategies towards 
parties: in particular, attention has been paid to the relative importance of issue-based contact 
with parties or parliamentary groups compared to interaction with other political actors or 
institutions (Binderkrantz, 2005). In the case of social democratic parties, Kitschelt (1994: 225) 
emphasizes trade union control of leadership appointments and thereby power relations.  
Such aspects are certainly relevant for the intersection between party and interest group 
politics. However, lexically, ‘relationship’ means ‘connection’ or ‘association’, and ‘the 
relation’ is what connects or binds participants in a relationship. In the remainder of this article, 
we understand ‘relationship’ in this way. Connections can be facilitated by different means, 
which we call ‘ties’. These are the attributes that create connections between the two sides 
(Granovetter, 1973) – in our case, between parties and interest organizations. Also in this sense, 
however, party-group relationships have been conceptualized in different ways. Table 1 sums 
up some of the most common alternative understandings and manifestations of party-group 
relationships as ‘connections’: interaction, resources and ideology. Some scholars also 
combine different understandings (e.g. Thomas, 2001; von Beyme, 1985: 191).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In all cases, the focus is implicitly or explicitly on the mechanisms that connect the 
sphere of social interests with the sphere of political parties. The emphasis on interaction goes 
back to the foundations of comparative politics. In the pioneering sociological studies, 
relationships between particular parties and interest groups were seen as manifestations of 
underlying social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). These studies were relatively 
unconcerned with the organizational structure of party-group relations. However, 
organizational links with interest groups were a focal point in the early, more institutionalist 
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literature. According to Duverger (1972 [1954]), the strongest links were manifested by parties 
whose members were collectively affiliated through trade unions. The literature on social 
democratic parties later showed that individual parties and trade unions could also be closely 
connected through, for example, liaison committees, leadership and membership overlap and 
interchange, and a wide arena of common collective activities (Allern and Bale, 2017). The 
focus on ties securing regular interaction is also widespread in newer studies (e.g. Rasmussen 
and Lindeboom, 2013; Eichenberger and Mach, 2017).  
The second common understanding emphasizes provision or sharing of resources, 
including finances, material support and information (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Hojnacki 
et al., 2012; Wilson, 1990). This emphasis goes back to the early studies of relationships 
between social democratic parties and trade unions, but is also echoed in more recent studies 
(e.g. Brunell, 2005). The involvement of interest groups in election campaigns and (indirect) 
partisan finance in the United States has even been interpreted as an indication of weakened 
formal autonomy of parties as organizations. In some studies parties are no longer primarily 
seen as the statutorily defined entity, but as networks of organizations (Bawn et al., 2012: 571, 
Koger et al., 2009), and interest groups that donate money as an integral part of this network 
(Herrnson, 2009). The sharing of less tangible resources, like information, has also been 
analysed as a possible component of party-group relations as ‘networks’ (Koger et al., 2010). 
However, when investigating interest group relationships with the stronger, less permeable 
European parties in addition to US parties, it seems appropriate to treat parties and interest 
groups as analytically distinct actors that may vary in the extent to which they are connected 
through sharing and provision of resources. 
Third, ‘relationship’ as connections is regularly applied in a nonconcrete sense, by 
pointing to a degree of ideological kinship (Poguntke, 2006). This conceptualization is, for 
example, at the core of the historical-institutional literature on labour movements (Minkin, 
1991). The idea of ideological ties is also echoed by the debate in the interest group literature 
on whether interest groups tend to lobby their ‘friends’ or ‘foes’ on specific issues (Hojnacki 
and Kimball, 1998; Marshall, 2015).  
The conceptual fuzziness illustrates that an ordinary term like ‘relationship’ even in the 
narrow sense does not provide sufficient clarity to decide what attributes must be included in a 
definition. Rather, like in many conceptual debates, the content depends on our research interest 
(cf. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002: 8). On the one hand, scholars approaching the topic from a 
societal angle, for example by addressing parties’ embeddedness in civil society, tend to focus 
on institutional ties providing interaction and perhaps ideology (e.g. Poguntke, 2000). On the 
6 
 
other hand, scholars primarily concerned with parties’ and interest groups’ influence on policy 
outputs are inclined to identify relations by following the flow of information and money rather 
than mapping organizational structures (e.g. Hojnacki et al., 2012).  
We focus on relationships in terms of structured interaction in the remainder of this 
article, as we believe such ties are a part of the democratic ‘infrastructure’ and relevant for both 
the input side and output side of politics. However, after discussing how we can specify this 
concept for empirical research, we also address the distinction and possible association between 
such ties and other types of ties (resources and ideology). 
Relationships as structured interaction  
Structured interaction is a specific version of relationship that manifests itself through different 
types of organizational ties. In this sense, our approach echoes political network analysis: we 
consider established relationships to be (possible) constraints on the action of individual actors 
(Victor et al., 2017). That said, we still assume parties and groups at the outset choose the extent 
to which they would like to get or keep being involved in structured relations with others and 
hereby become organizationally interdependent. 2  Moreover, we look at the relationships 
between parties and groups only: we do not also aim to study parties’ possible ties to other 
parties and ties between groups, i.e. the complete, national ‘party-group network’ and hereby 
possible dependencies between different dyads (Huhe et al., 2017; Ward et al., 2011).  
Since we are focusing on interaction, ties that can shape mutual decision-making, 
planning, and coordination of activities or simply involve communication about political issues 
are at the centre of attention. The question is how to distinguish relations, in terms of structured 
interaction, from frequent contact on specific issues (‘lobbyism’) (see e.g. Celis et al., 2016), 
and how to measure the whole range from integrated organizational structures and formal 
alliances to the looser ties created by informal routines and personnel overlaps and transfers.  
First, we may conclude that relationships imply a certain degree of permanence, which 
is different from sporadic contact between parties and interest groups. Second, relationships 
imply a certain degree of routine in that these interactions do not occur randomly or purely 
related to a specific issue. Instead, they are the result of organizational routines, which may or 
may not be formalized. To know each other by name, or from time to time meet by chance at 
different arenas or events, does not qualify as a relationship between parties and interest groups. 
                                                 
2 A possible exception is parties and groups that were originally a single organization, like for instance the 
Norwegian Farmers’ Union and Farmers’ Party. However, usually such structures will eventually split into two 
(perhaps overlapping), due to the functional difference of each ‘wing’ (in terms of goal-seeking and methods). 
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A minimum level of structure (regularity) is required for a relationship to exist. What we aim 
to capture is ties securing stable access, not isolated interaction only at a single point in time, 
regarding a particular issue, or simply the sum of such contacts.  
Third, a distinction can be made between ties in terms of the degree of formalization. 
Highly formal ties – like a joint policy committee – are more difficult to terminate than informal 
ones because the political costs tend to be higher in that they require highly visible – formal or 
even statutory – change (Poguntke, 2002: 47). A prominent European example is the ‘Co-
operation Committee’ between the Norwegian Labour Party and Confederation of Trade 
Unions. Here top-leaders have met regularly to discuss important policy matters for more than 
a century (Allern, 2010: 132–33). Less formal (not rule-based, but official) ties, on the other 
hand, may also exhibit a substantial organizational component, which can raise the political 
costs of termination. If they consist of ‘tacit agreements’ about regular meetings of specific 
office holders of parties and organizations, they are also difficult to cancel because this 
inevitably makes the relations between a party and a given interest group a highly visible public 
issue. For instance, the Dutch Catholic party had the tacit understanding with Catholic labour 
and business interest groups that they would have representation on its decision-making bodies 
between the 1920s and 1960s (Lijphart, 1968). Regularized informal meetings of leading 
figures of parties and interest groups which do not have the character of an ‘official summit’ 
are also relevant as the organizational structures must be invested and lived and since some 
parties and groups might prefer to only have such ties. Since such ties do not involve specific 
incumbents, they are clearly less visible and hence easier to discontinue. Hence, we assume 
there is an underlying continuum ranging from strong (formal; written and/or official) to weak 
ties (informal; unofficial, i.e. no specific incumbents).  
We define, then, relationships to consist of ties that connect decision-making bodies, 
headquarters and/or the decision-makers or staff, i.e. those means by which a party and an 
interest group may interact repeatedly (Allern and Bale, 2017: 9). From hereon we will use the 
term organizational ties between parties and interest groups to denote the object of study. Based 
on such ties, pairs of parties and groups make up organizational dyads, but both are also 
connected to more than one actor on the party/group side (see below).3 This definition is narrow 
                                                 
3 Seen from both the individual party and interest group point of view, a basic aspect of party-group relationships 
is how inclusive they are. Are their relationships ‘open’ or ‘exclusive’, and if so, how many and what kind of 
groups/parties are involved in each ‘web’ of relationships? However, while the conceptual distinction between 
strength and inclusiveness will certainly facilitate mapping of the relational landscape of party-interest group 
relationships, we focus on how to identify and measure relationships between individual parties and groups in this 
paper.  
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but sufficiently rich to discriminate between dyads. It is narrower than the well-known concept 
of ‘linkage’, which includes more forms of interaction between parties and society, including 
parties’ own collateral organizations (Poguntke 2002).  
 As indicated above, the strength of organizational ties primarily reflects the extent to 
which contact is made formal or otherwise structured. Ties – such as collective affiliation of 
interest groups to parties, liaison committees or routines for invitations to regular party/group 
events – create such structures. Also, a less formal or purely informal contact might be 
predictable and structured if it is regular and normalized (Kitschelt, 1989: 231–33). Thus, ties 
can be characterized by different degrees of formalization and thus institutionalization. We can 
therefore distinguish between statutory ties, inter-organizational ties and informal ties.  
Statutory ties are by definition durable; they may be reciprocal or one-sided and can 
include collective membership or reserved seats in leadership bodies. A trade union leader may, 
for example, sit on the national executive of a Labour party or may have the right to cast a vote 
on behalf of his or her membership in a leadership contest (Bale and Webb, 2017). Joint party-
group arrangements are the strongest example of inter-organizational ties. They are also 
durable and reciprocal, whereas others like arranged consultations or regularized congress 
invitations are by nature one-way and occasional (event-related). Such ties are by nature easier 
to establish to multiple actors than the durable ties as they are less costly (time-consuming).  
An exclusive focus on organizational measures can, however, lead to a bias towards 
firmly organized parties. Yet, parties and organizations may develop routines for regular 
meetings between their elites without invoking any formal party organizational body. As long 
as they meet in their official roles, these are still formal meetings and are therefore included 
under inter-organizational ties. Once such meetings are merely informal, they are subsumed 
under informal ties, together with personnel overlaps, namely the extent to which party elites 
hold positions in interest groups and vice versa. While the latter are not about frameworks and 
activities, they still open up multiple opportunities for interaction between decision-makers (for 
a complete list of different ties see Table A1, online appendix).  
The over-all structure of the concept of relationship as structured interaction between 
individual parties and groups is summarized in Figure 1. As the preceding discussion indicates, 
we assume that there is a hierarchy of ties and that the number of ties matter for the overall 
strength of organizational relationships. The specific property of structured interaction is that 
this interaction is based on: 
a) Most formal: statutory ties (Figure 1, left ties) 
b) Less formal: inter-organizational ties (Figure 1, middle ties) and/or  
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c) Informal ties (individuals without specific organizational roles) (Figure 1, right ties)  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Individual types of ties might of course be interesting by themselves. However, we focus 
on how to measure strength of relationships more broadly. To capture the different components 
of attributes, one needs to rely on multiple organizational indicators (like the existence of joint 
party-group arrangements) but also behavioural measures (like regular top-leadership contact). 
The former ensure that we do not underestimate the degree of institutionalization; the latter will 
capture weaker ties. However, we concentrate on those who occupy formal roles and do not 
seek to capture purely informal ties. We thus analyse interactions between organizational elites 
because they are politically mandated to represent their organizations.  
To assess the general level of strength (‘institutionalization’), one will have to count the 
number of ties and take the types of ties into account: from the strongest (most formal) to the 
weaker (less formal/informal) ones (see Figure 1). However, it is not given that they form a 
single scale (Rasmussen and Lindeboom, 2013). The distinction between our main categories 
of ties could also imply different basic categories of relationships. Hence, it requires empirical 
examination whether we can aggregate organizational ties across all types and party 
organizational spheres. There are, to begin with, good reasons to assume multi-dimensionality: 
Historically, weaker (less formal) ties have been seen as an alternative to and compensation for 
the lack of stronger (formal) ties. For example, when a group enjoys formal representation in 
party committees or vice versa, a liaison committee seems superfluous (Allern, 2010). Likewise, 
a tie based on overlapping leadership has been seen as the tool for those preferring formal 
autonomy but still close relations – like in the French case of left-of-centre parties and trade 
unions. Here informal ties have been argued to create an ‘organic liaison’ (Parsons, 2017: 113). 
If different categories of ties were unrelated, more than one dimension might be necessary to 
analyze relationships. 
Yet, different ties may also supplement each other in that having a strong (formal) tie 
increases the chance of having lower-level ties (Allern and Bale, 2017). The reason for this is, 
at least, two-fold: First, it may appear unreasonable to exclude someone you are formally 
committed to from a less ‘exclusive’ arrangement even if they might need this access less than 
others. Second, if representatives of parties and groups regularly meet in formal settings, they 
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also get frequent opportunities to participate in informal meetings in hallways and the like. 
Hence, we expect that ties form a single/one-dimensional yet hierarchical scale of strength: 
 
The Dimensionality Expectation: Dyads that have more formal (stronger) 
organizational ties tend to have also weaker organizational ties, while dyads that have less 
formal (weak) ties do not necessarily have stronger ties.  
 We also argue that structured interaction is different from provision or sharing of 
material resources and ideological proximity as organizational ties might exist without financial 
and ideological connections and vice versa. From a theoretical perspective, it is perfectly 
possible, for example, that parties and interest groups interact in a structured manner with no 
money involved or without being ideologically close. To be sure, intensive resource provision 
and policy alignment makes organizational ties more likely, but they are not logically dependent 
on each other. Informational networks do not necessarily require formal organizational ties. 
Empirically, this means that we expect that different types of relationships are not strongly 
correlated because they reflect different underlying dimensions; they are not just indicators of 
the same phenomenon. Hence to validate our conceptual map, we will also check whether it 
holds empirically that there are no strong positive correlations between material resources, 
ideological proximity and organizational ties. 
 
Research Design  
To test our theoretical expectations, we concentrate on mature democracies in order to compare 
parties with similar historical preconditions but different institutional settings. We use a new 
cross-national interest group survey data set on interest group-party connections in Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.4 The 
countries differ in terms of party finance regime (e.g. level of state finance and degree of 
regulations), the level of corporatism/pluralism and the extent to which a single individual party 
controls the policy-making process. These are all aspects that might influence the incentives for 
interest groups and parties to establish relations.  
Sampling and Survey Data 
A random sample in each country was drawn from an identified population of interest groups. 
When creating the frames for interest group sampling, we relied on existing directories and lists 
                                                 
4 “Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies” (PAIRDEM), see 
https://pairdem.org/pairdem/  
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of national interest group populations in all countries (see Allern et al., 2020 for an overview 
of the interest group definition and the primary sources used).5 To make sure that a significant 
number of key players were covered, a purposive sample was added including up to 10 ‘most 
important interest groups’ within eight broader categories closely related to specific policy 
fields and political cleavages. Merged with the random sample, the total sample mirrors the 
general group population with a certain ‘over-sampling’ of major, politically relevant actors. 
We asked interest groups about their ties with all relevant parties in their country: i.e. parties 
that had representation (at least one seat) in national parliament in one or more of the last three 
elections and scored more than 1% of the votes in at least one of the three elections or more 
than 2% of the votes in the last election but no seats.  
Obviously, it is empirically impossible to identify all existing ties between parties and 
interest groups. Both have multiple organizational faces horizontally, several levels vertically 
(territorial, organizational, individual) and take part in an endless number of decision-making 
processes where relations may manifest themselves. Hence, we choose to concentrate on the 
relationship between the central organizations/headquarters of both sides, plus the legislative 
party groups, and their leaderships. 
 To gather the data we used an online survey of the samples.6 857 out of 2944 interest 
groups responded (29%). The response rates across countries vary, as in previous interest group 
research. The response rates for different group types vary to a lesser extent – from 20% to 
nearly 40%. When comparing the composition of samples and the groups that responded, we 
see that there are no major biases in terms of group types although professional/occupational 
groups are slightly over-represented and business groups somewhat under-represented in 
general. Country biases exist, but we will not disaggregate the results to the country-level here 
(see Allern et al. 2020 for details on samples and response rates). We continually look at both 
the entire sample (which contains both randomly and purposively sampled groups) and the 
purposive sample separately to see if the associations are different when we zoom in on major 
organizations of high party-political relevance.  
Our unit of analysis is pairs of individual interest groups and parties and their relations 
as reported by the interest group side. We cannot validate this with reports from the party side,7 
but it is reasonable to assume that groups have not withheld much information, as the survey 
                                                 
5 With the exception of Norway, where we had to do the identification from scratch based on a public legal register. 
6 The top choice for informants was the person responsible for governmental affairs/public relations/public policy 
work. For groups that do not employ such a person, the director-general, head of communications, etc. was 
addressed stead instead. For more details on the party identification and sampling, see Allern et al. 
7 Party survey data concerning ties to individual interest groups do not exist due to the high number of groups.  
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questions are very technical in nature and respondents were promised anonymity. The high 
level of variance and the high number of valid responses suggest that in general the survey 
questions have worked well.8  
Operationalizations  
The article has a theory-driven measurement strategy. The goal of the analysis is twofold: 
Firstly, when it comes to structured interaction, we aim to analyze whether dyads that have less 
common, more formal (stronger) ties also have the more common, less formal (weaker) ties 
(Dimensionality Expectation). We therefore measure ties both at the organizational and 
individual level (in terms of regularized leadership contact). Secondly, we seek to assess to 
what extent the different kinds of relationships between interest groups and parties are not only 
conceptually but also empirically distinct. 
To operationalize structured interaction, we use two indicators (see Table A1, online 
appendix). The first indicator is formed by inter-organizational ties measured at the 
organizational level, namely the existence of general organizational ties like joint arrangements, 
agreements and regular event invitations between groups and parties’ central organization 
and/or legislative group. Statutory ties are excluded (the first column in Table A1, online 
appendix) as only central party organizations can have this.9 The second indicator is formed by 
ties generated from individual level, in terms of regularized top-leadership contacts between 
groups and parties’ central organization and legislative group. In both cases, we calculate 
aggregate tie scores. Hence, we cover a broad range of levels of formalization and we are able 
to tap into relevant individual-level activities in terms of leadership meetings (among specific 
incumbents). We leave informal ties out as these require data on the entire elite universe and 
biographical data.10  
To operationalize provision or sharing of resources, we focus on tangible material 
resources that can be transferred from groups to political parties. In the PAIDEM dataset groups 
report if they provided a direct financial contribution, an indirect financial contribution, or if 
they contributed labour, material resources or their organizations’ premises during election 
                                                 
8 See Allern et al. 
9 Previous research suggests that they are very rare (Allern and Verge, 2017). 
10  Table A.6, online appendices looks at the informant’s subjective perception of both the strength of the 
collaboration and of the organizational connection (formal and informal). A scale of these two items correlates 
strongly with the structured interaction measures: where there are ties or contacts, respondents also tend to perceive 
connections and collaboration. This suggests that while theoretically distinct, the format and intensity of 
interaction is hard to distinguish from the strategic aspect related to the content of it. If you interact in a regularized 
manner you tend to do this with a certain purpose: coordinate your actions in order to achieve a shared goal. There 
are weaker but significant correlations with donations and ideological distance.  
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campaigns to particular parties. We construct a five-item scale – named group donations – from 
these items.11  
To measure ideological proximity or distance between a political party and interest 
groups we need information on both. The PAIRDEM survey asked groups to position 
themselves on six eleven-point scales. Three concerned ‘new politics’ issues: the environment, 
immigration and, social lifestyle. Three concerned ‘old politics’ economic issues: government 
intervention in the economy, redistribution and the choice between lower taxation or better 
public services. We borrowed these items from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES, see 
Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). Our survey respondents were provided with the party 
positions from CHES, so they could position their group relative to the parties in order to avoid 
the Differential Item Functioning problem (Golder and Stramski, 2010) and compare the 
interest groups’ self-positioning directly with the CHES positioning to calculate the absolute 
party-group distance on six issue dimensions.12 
Method and structure of analysis 
The unit of analysis is, as noted above, group-party dyads. First, we look at how widespread 
the different ties are and see if the frequency pattern mirrors the theoretical hierarchy of ties 
(see items in Table A1 in online appendix). Next, we examine the dimensionality using Mokken 
scaling as measurement model. This method belongs to the techniques associated with Item 
Response Theory (IRT) and is very well-suited for our analytical purpose and binary variables 
(van der Ark et al., 2005): it tests whether responses form a single hierarchical scale. Our 
expectation is that groups that have stronger (less common) ties also have weaker (more 
common) ties at the organizational level: If groups have permanent joint committee with a 
party, for example, they also invite that party to their national congress. In assessing the 
scalability, we use the following benchmark values (H): below 0.3 (very poor), below 0.4 
(poor), below 0.5 (medium), below 0.6 (good), beyond 0.6 (very good). 
Based on the results, we calculate an index – labelled strength of organizational-level 
ties. Thereafter we do the same for two different items of top-leadership-contact and see 
whether this is strongly correlated with organizational-level aggregate ties score, as we expect 
(i.e. that ties at the organizational-level nurtures this at the individual level). We also perform 
                                                 
11 We compared the survey responses on direct financial contributions with publicly available information on such 
donations (both automatically and manually to the extent needed) to test the validity of the survey responses. There 
were extremely few cases of mismatch (i.e. ‘no’-answers but registered donations) and the existing ones could be 
explained by response categories and reporting rules, rather than dishonest answers. Hence, we consider the 
validity of this survey measure to be sufficiently good. 
12 An entry was removed from the analysis if the interest group did not have a position on the dimension in 
question.  
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a scaling analysis to confirm this pattern. Finally, we look at the correlations between these 
measures of ties securing structured interaction with the measures of resource provision and 
ideological proximity to see whether concepts are not only analytically but also empirically 
distinct. In online appendix 2 we validate these patterns by looking at a factor analysis for 
tetrachoric correlations.  
Structured interaction: Empirical results 
Firstly, we look at whether groups report having organized arrangements and routines for 
interacting with political parties, be it to the central organization and/or the legislative party 
group (Table 2).13 In the complete sample, these ties are scarce: less than 1% of groups report 
the least common tie (tacit agreements about one-sided/mutual representation) and 13% of 
groups report the most common one (parties being invited to the group’s congress). In the 
purposive sample, these ties are, as expected, much more common. Here, for instance, parties 
are invited to the group’s congress in 41% of the dyads. For about 2% of the purposively 
selected party-group pairs, a tacit agreement about regular meetings is reported. Hence, the 
ascending frequency of ties mirrors the theoretical hierarchy presented in Table A1, online 
appendix.  
We see from the H-values in Table 2 that the items form a scale of medium strength for 
both samples. The resulting scale – a total tie score ranging from 0 to 13 – has a strongly left-
skewed distribution (see bottom of Table 2). A minority of group-party dyads score high and 
have all the possible ties, some have a medium score, but most have a lower score or not even 
a few weaker ties. On average, groups in the total sample report less than one kind of tie per 
party while groups from the purposive sample report on average more than two.  
 
 
Tables 2 & 3 about here 
 
                                                 
13 The survey item used is: “First, we would like to find out whether the organization has any joint arrangements 
or agreements or other organized routines for contact with parties at the national level. As these materialize, and 
might fluctuate, over time, we would like you to think not only about how things are at present but how they have 
been for the last few years. Has your organization had the following kinds of joint arrangements or agreements 
with one or more parties’ central organization and/or parliamentary party in the last five years?” The question note 
specified “If your organization was founded only in the last five years, please refer to however long it has been in 
existence”. 
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The next question is whether groups report regular top-leadership meetings between the 
group and individual parties.14 These ties are reported in Table 3 separately for the central party 
office (CPO) and legislative party groups (LPG). Contacts with CPOs are less common than 
contacts with LPGs. On average groups report contacts with 1 in 10 CPOs and 1 in 7 LPGs. In 
the purposive sample, such ties are more common. Purposively selected groups report contact 
with one in three CPOs and two out of five LPGs. The items form a good scale: the groups that 
have ties to some LPGs report having ties to that party’s CPO as well. 
Finally, the question is whether strong ties at the organizational level preclude or nurture 
top-leadership ties. Do the scales on organizational ties and leadership contact measure the 
same variance? We find that there is a strong correlation between the inter-organizational ties 
and regularized top-level leadership contacts (see Table 5). In both samples, there is a strong 
correlation between regular top leadership contacts and organizational ties. The leaders of 
groups and parties that have organizational ties also tend to interact regularly with each other 
at the individual level. To validate, we also run a scaling analysis. The combined scale with the 
top-leadership contact score and the inter-organizational ties scale has a H-value of 0.51. This 
implies that these two items fit the hierarchical structure of the inter-organizational ties scale. 
In the hierarchical structure, leadership contacts fall in the same range as the informal ties. This 
confirms the internal pattern revealed at the organizational level regarding formalization. 
Hence, we see that the Dimensionality Expectation receives empirical support.  
Is structured interaction empirically distinct from other concepts?  
The central idea of this contribution is that structured interaction is distinct from the other 
possible relationships between interest groups and parties, most prominently, in terms of 
transfer or sharing of resources and ideological proximity (see Table 1). We begin by examining 
the descriptives and diagnostics of these variables, before we present the correlations between 
the different variables. 
Firstly, we look at material resources. We asked groups about five kinds of donations, 
including financial and material support (see Table 4). These direct resource exchanges are 
extremely rare: they occur in 1% of dyads in the total sample and 3% of the purposive sample. 
Groups that donate one kind of resource also donate other kinds of resources. The items form 
                                                 
14 The survey item used is: “Please indicate whether representatives of the organization’s executive leadership 
have been in contact with leading figures from one or more parties to discuss current issues of political relevance 
on a regular basis in the last 12 months (yes-no). The question note specified “by leading party figures we mean 
the elected top leaders and other executive members in the national party organization, the party’s parliamentary 
leader(s) and party spokespersons in different policy fields. By ‘regular basis’ we mean that the meetings have 
been numerous and normalized.” Thus, this item captures ties at the individual level of parties and groups. 
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a medium to good scale. The combined scale – a score of group donations ranging from 0 to 5 
– has quite a skewed distribution: the average score is only 0.02 out of five for the total scale 
and 0.08 for the purposive scale (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Next, we turn to ideological proximity as basis for relationships. Here we do not look 
at scales but at the distance between expert placement of parties and group self-placement on 
each of the six Chapel Hill policy dimensions mentioned above: three of which are economic 
in nature and three of which touch on ‘new politics’ issues. Dyads vary between maximum 
distance and nearly full proximity (see Table A.5, online appendix for the descriptives).15 Table 
5 sheds light on the correlations for both the purposive and total sample, but as the figures do 
not differ strongly, we focus the discussion on the total sample. 
As shown above, the correlations between the inter-organizational ties and the top-
leadership contacts, both indicators of structured interaction, are strong. The remaining 
correlations are, in contrast, (rather) weak to negligible. Five out of 21 correlations were not 
significant. The correlations between donations and the other measure of the strength of ties are 
quite weak. This mirrors the strong left-skew in the donations scale. In the limited number of 
cases where donations occur, there always is some organizational tie, but in the large majority 
of cases where there are organizational ties, the groups do not offer material resources to the 
parties (98%).16 The pattern for top-leadership contacts is similar but weaker.  Correlations tend 
to be significant and in the expected direction but weak. In the majority of cases where resources 
are provided, regular top-level contacts occur (71%), but material resources are only provided 
to parties in 3% of cases where top-leadership contacts occur.17  
Ideological proximity is not strongly correlated with the strength of inter-organizational 
ties, regularized top-leadership contacts or donations. The correlations are weak. One out of 
three correlations for ideological distance is not significant. This shows that ideological 
closeness, resource ties and interaction ties are empirically distinct. 
                                                 
15 We only include groups that were willing and able to place themselves on items. As some groups did not for 
specific items, the N fluctuates. 
16 This implies a hierarchical structure. If we include the donation items in the interorganizational ties scale, this 
scale has a H of 0.48 (the total sample) or 0.50 (in the purposive sample). The donations are of the same or higher 
rarity as tacit agreements about one-sided representation. 
17 Here again a scaling approach shows that the structure is hierarchical (H=0.77 for the total sample, H=0.68 for 
the purposive sample). 
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All in all, our expectation that the correlations between structured interaction and the 
other operationalizations of party-interest group relations are empirically distinct, is supported 
by the data: the correlations between the scores are positive but not very strong.  
 
Table 5 about here 
  
Conclusion 
In this article, we first reviewed how party-interest group relationships have been 
conceptualized and measured in different strands of the scholarly literature. We focused on 
organizational interaction and argued that this differs from other variants of relationships such 
as resource provision/transfer and ideological alignment. This structured interaction is also 
analytically distinct from lobbyism, i.e. ad hoc contact on specific issues. Moreover, we argued 
that organizational ties are likely to form a single/one-dimensional yet hierarchical scale of 
strength. 
Taken together, the empirical analyses based on a novel data set largely confirm our 
conceptual map. First, stronger (formal) ties are rare but tend to go together with weaker and 
more common (informal) ties of groups to parties. This suggests that structured interaction is a 
one-dimensional phenomenon. Second, organizational ties are empirically distinct from ties in 
terms of resource provision or ideological proximity. Hence, the analytical distinctions 
identified above hold empirically.  
Our findings have multiple implications for future research. The one-dimensional yet 
hierarchical structure suggests that different ties are stimulated by the same factors but that it 
probably takes more – for example tangible resources – to establish stronger ties than weaker 
ones. Could it still be that the importance of some factors vary for the various levels of 
institutionalization? And could it be that formal ties themselves nurture weaker ones? Future 
explanatory analyses should take these issues carefully into account. 
Furthermore, the different relationship concepts presented in our literature review 
should be treated as distinct. If one studies financial or informational (e.g. resource) ties, for 
example, that does not necessarily mean that one identifies relationships in the institutional 
sense ‘by proxy’. Moreover, organizational ties are not an indication of ideological friendship 
and vice versa. Ideological neighbors can be political enemies and hence organizationally 
completely unrelated. Thus, scholars should carefully clarify what concept they address and 
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why, preferably using a more precise term than simply ‘relationships’, ‘networks’ and ‘ties’ 
when denoting the object of research.  
Focusing on variation in structured interaction, our analysis suggests that a group and 
party that are ideologically close do not ‘magically’ develop organizational or leadership ties. 
Furthermore, if leadership ties or organizational ties are present, groups do not automatically 
transfer resources to parties. The various resources parties and interest groups might offer to 
each other should rather be seen as possible explanatory factors or outcomes of structured 
organizational ties between an interest group and a political party. Whether there is a causal 
relationship between variables measuring organizational ties and collaboration, resource 
transfer or provision and ideological affinity is a matter for future empirical research.  
Future analyses should also try to fill the descriptive gaps of this paper, for example by 
looking at personnel overlaps and transfers and by collecting other types of data on individual-
level behaviour. So far, we have only looked at aggregated data and do not say anything about 
variation between countries or different types of parties and groups.  
Our findings also speak to the literature on political networks. They confirm that many 
parties and interest groups are interdependent by means of ties creating institutional relations. 
Thus, when studying their behaviour in other respects, including policy-making, one should 
take such ties into account as they might enable cooperation and constrain individual party-
group choices. The existence of durable ties means that external groups have stable access to 
party decision-makers and are likely to be consulted in key issues. For example, permanent 
consultation arrangements make contact in specific policy issues more likely and, in turn, also 
the alignment of preferences. Thus, stronger ties to specific groups might make the adoption of 
certain policies more likely (e.g. Guidi and Karagiannis, 2016).  
Moreover, scholars have recently suggested that strong party organizations broaden the 
constituencies to which policymakers respond and help politicians to solve coordination 
problems. This might facilitate better economic management, public services, and political 
stability and hereby enhance economic growth (Bizzaro et al., 2018). Similar analyses could be 
conducted based on detailed knowledge on how major parties are organizationally linked to 
different civic actors.  
Either way, we need more knowledge about these organizational structures in 
contemporary politics if we want to better understand policy outputs and decision-making 
across political systems. Our analyses suggest that one should continue bridging the field of 
party and interest group research. We have shown that in an age of eroding cleavages there is a 
considerable degree of structured and organizationally petrified interaction between political 
19 
 
parties and interest groups in modern European democracies. It is essential to map and 
understand the inherent mechanics of these relationships if we want to understand the 
functioning of both party and interest group politics. 
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Table 1. Alternative manifestations of party-interest group relationships at the national level 
Kind of 
Relationship 
Interaction Resources Ideology 
Examples of 
specific ties  
Guaranteed (mutual) executive 
representation, liaison 
committee, regularized (elite) 
meetings, leadership 
overlap/transfers 
 
Financial donations, 
transfer of labour, shared 
resource pools, provision/ 
sharing of information 
Degrees of ideological 
affinity, the idea of 
enduring ‘friends and 
foes’ 
Source: Allern and Bale (2012 and 2017) with own modifications.  
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Table 2: Inter-organizational Ties (Organizational Level)* 
Sample Total Purposive 
Variable H % H % 
Tacit Agreement on One-Sided Mutual Representation 0.54 <1 0.62 2 
Written agreements on Regular meetings 0.43 <1 0.45 2 
Permanent Joint Committee 0.54 1 0.54 5 
Temporary Joint Committee 0.40 3 0.52 9 
Joint Party-Groups Conferences 0.39 3 0.41 9 
Joint Party-Group Actions 0.43 3 0.30 12 
Interest Group Invited to Party’s National Congress 0.44 5 0.45 21 
Tacit Agreement on Regular Meetings 0.51 6 0.46 24 
Interest Group Invited to Party’s Internal Meetings 0.55 8 0.55 31 
Party Invited to Interest Group’s Internal Meetings 0.51 11 0.45 36 
Interest Group Invited to Party’s Special Meetings 0.54 11 0.57 39 
Party Invited to Interest Group’s Special Meetings 0.54 12 0.52 36 
Party Invited to Interest Group’s National Congress 0.48 13 0.44 41 
H 0.49  0.48  
Mean 0.78 2.61 
Median 0.00 2.00 
Standard deviation 1.73 2.75 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 13.00 13.00 
N 4474 625 
* The table presents scaling (H) values, frequencies of individual ties (percent) and descriptives for the aggregated 
“strength of organizational-level ties” (0-13) at the bottom. 
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Table 3: Regularized Top-leadership Contacts (Individual Level)* 
Sample Total Purposive 
Variable H % H % 
Leadership contacts group-central party organization 0.88 9 0.85 28 
Leadership contacts group-legislative party group 0.88 13 0.85 39 
H 0.88  0.85  
Mean 0.11 0.33 
Median 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation 0.29 0.43 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 
N 6058 1126 
* The table presents scaling (H) values, frequencies of leadership contact with central party organizations and 
legislative party group separately (percent) and descriptives for the aggregated “total leadership contact score” (0-
1) at the bottom. 
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Table 4: Material Resources: Group Donations* 
Sample Total Purposive 
Variable H % H % 
Direct financial donation 0.64 <1 0.64 2 
Indirect financial donations 0.59 <1 0.61 2 
Offering labour 0.50 <1 0.50 1 
Offering material support 0.62 <1 0.65 1 
Offering premises 0.68 <1 0.68 1 
H 0.60  0.54  
Mean 0.02 0.08 
Median 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation 0.23 0.48 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 5.00 5.00 
N 4719 1063 
* The table presents scaling (H) values, frequencies of individual donations and descriptives for the aggregated 
group donations score (0-5) at the bottom. 
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Table 5: Correlations between the various tie measures 
   Ideological distance on… 
 Total 
Leadership 
Contact 
Score 
Donations Services 
and taxes 
Redistri-
bution 
State 
inter-
vention 
Social 
life-style 
Immi-
gration 
Environment 
Total sample 
Strength of 
organizational-level 
ties 
0.65*** 0.23*** -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.04 -0.11*** 
Total leadership 
contact score 
- 0.14*** -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 
Donations  - 0.02 -0.05** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
Purposive sample 
Strength of 
organizational-level 
ties 
0.62*** 0.24*** -0.25*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.10* -0.04 -0.21*** 
Total leadership 
contact score 
- 0.11*** -0.12*** -0.23*** -0.13*** -0.06 -0.12*** -0.11*** 
Donations  - 0.05 -0.10** -0.10** -0.04 -0.05 -0.07* 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Online Appendices   
 
Appendix 1: List of Types of Ties and Indicators  
Table A1 Structural and behavioural indicators of relational ties between parties and interest 
groups at the national level, with items listed in hierarchical order of strength  
Statutory ties 
 
Inter-organizational ties Informal ties 
National/local collective 
affiliation (membership) of a 
group to party (assuming 
parties are not affiliated to 
groups) 
 
The party enjoys 
representation rights in the 
group’s national decision-
making bodies (one or 
more) 
 
The group enjoys 
representation rights in the 
party’s national decision-
making bodies (one or 
more) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reciprocal, durable: Joint 
arrangements/agreements/meetings: 
 Written vs. tacit agreements 
about 
representation/meetings 
 Permanent vs. temporary 
arrangements for interaction 
 
 
One-way, occasional: Party/group-
arranged consultations, meetings 
and routines: 
 Regularized invitations to 
different party/group events 
and consultations  
 Regularized invitations to 
specific party/group 
decision-making 
processes/different policy 
areas  
 Routines for getting input 
from/ talking to specific 
parties/groups in different 
decision-making 
processes/policy areas  
 
**** 
Regular formal (i.e. official) actual 
contact between individual 
representatives and spokesmen 
 
Reciprocal, durable: 
Informal meetings: 
Regular informal (i.e. 
unofficial) actual contact 
between individual 
representatives and 
spokesmen 
  
Personnel: 
Personal overlaps in – or 
transfers to – the 
party’s/group’s decision-
making units:  
 Party/group top elite 
members who hold 
or have held office 
in union/party (share 
of overlap between 
bodies in sum) 
 Party/group top elite 
members who are or 
have been staff 
members at the 
national or local 
levels in party/group  
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Appendix 2: Additional scaling analysis 
Classical Test Theory methods like Factor Analysis are based on the assumptions of correlation, 
which assumes among other things, a normal distribution instead of a binary one. However, in 
Appendix 2 we look at factor analysis based on tetrachoric correlations, specifically meant for 
binary items. For all scales a single dimensional item captures more than half of the variance. 
Thus, the results are robust across these model specifications.  
 
Table A2 Tetrachoric Factor Analysis of Interest Group Report on Inter-organizational Ties  
Sample Total Purposive 
Tacit Agreement on One-Sided Mutual Representation 0.80 0.80 
Written agreements on Regular meetings 0.70 0.59 
Permanent Joint Committee 0.82 0.76 
Temporary Joint Committee 0.76 0.79 
Joint Party-Groups Conferences 0.74 0.66 
Joint Party-Group Actions 0.80 0.54 
Interest Group Invited to Party’s National Congress 0.78 0.68 
Tacit Agreement on Regular Meetings 0.89 0.79 
Interest Group Invited to Party’s Internal Meetings 0.88 0.88 
Party Invited to Interest Group’s Internal Meetings 0.83 0.68 
Interest Group Invited to Party’s Special Meetings 0.87 0.86 
Party Invited to Interest Group’s Special Meetings 0.84 0.75 
Party Invited to Interest Group’s National Congress 0.79 0.69 
SS Loadings 8.53 7.07 
Percentage Explained Variance 66% 54% 
N 4474 625 
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Table A3 Regularized Top-leadership Contacts 
Sample Total Purposive 
Leadership contacts with CPO 0.96 0.94 
Leadership contacts with LPG 0.96 0.94 
SS Loadings 1.84 1.77 
Percentage Explained Variance 92% 89% 
N 6058 1126 
 
Table A4 Tetrachoric Factor Analysis of Material resources: group donations 
Sample Total Purposive 
Direct financial donation 0.94 0.94 
Indirect financial donations 0.94 0.93 
Offering labour 0.93 0.90 
Offering material support 0.97 0.97 
Offering premises 0.98 0.97 
SS Loadings 4.53 4.45 
Percentage Explained Variance 91% 89% 
N 4719 1063 
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Table A5 Ideological distance between parties and groups, by policy dimensions: 
Descriptives 
Sample 
 
Total Purposive 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. N 
Distance on:             
Services and 
taxes 
2.81 2.33 2.02 0 9.45 2576 2.74 2.33 2.00 0 9.00 747 
Redistri-
bution 
2.59 2.00 1.95 0 9.40 2488 2.51 2.00 1.88 0 9.40 759 
State 
intervention 
2.66 2.33 1.87 0 9.57 2764 2.70 2.36 1.86 0 9.57 904 
Social 
lifestyle 
3.48 2.91 2.45 0 9.88 2593 3.38 2.80 2.42 0 9.88 712 
Immigration 2.64 2.33 1.81 0 9.50 2389 2.65 2.33 1.80 0 8.41 730 
Environ-
ment 
2.74 2.33 1.98 0 9.40 3075 2.79 2.33 2.02 0 9.33 906 
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Table A6 Scale of Subjective Perception of Relationship 
Sample Total Purposive 
Subjective Perception of Collaboration 0.87 0.81 
Subjective Perception of Organizational Connection 0.87 0.81 
H 0.87 0.81 
Correlation 0.81*** 0.75*** 
Mean 1.58 2.32 
Median 1.00 2.00 
Standard deviation 0.97 1.19 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 5.00 5.00 
N 6341 1291 
Inter-organizational ties 0.75*** 0.72*** 
Top-leadership contacts 0.61*** 0.54*** 
Donations 0.18*** 0.20*** 
Distance on Services and taxes -0.13*** -0.18*** 
Distance on Redistribution -0.13*** -0.20*** 
Distance on State intervention -0.15*** -0.23*** 
Distance on Social lifestyle -0.10*** -0.16*** 
Distance Immigration -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Distance Environment -0.14*** -0.19*** 
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